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eginning in 2005, hundreds of Africans, mostly 
from Sudan and Eritrea, entered Israel across 
the Egyptian border. They typically paid 
smugglers in Egypt to take them to the border, where 
they were able to climb over the border fence. By 2009 
about 22,000 non-Jewish individuals without 
authorization had crossed over into Israel, where the 
government labeled them "infiltrators" and "illegal 
work migrants." Of these, 1,250 were from South 
Sudan.1 Most of these migrants had left Sudan during 
or before the Second Sudanese Civil War, fought 
between the Sudanese government and the South 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from 1983 
to 2005. By 2012 the number stood at between 700 and 
1000. Private organizations provided services to 
facilitate what they called "voluntary repatriation" back 
to South Sudan. I evaluate here the moral obligations 
of these organizations. I will ask whether they were 
exploitative, negligent, or perhaps complicit in broader 
Israeli government policies that may have been unjust. 
 
 
In January 2012...  Israel’s  Population  and 
Immigration Authority (PIBA) sent an open letter to 
South Sudanese in Israel telling them “Now that 
South Sudan has become an independent state, it is 
time for you to return to your homeland.” 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2008 I founded a student group, Advocates for 
Asylum, and a website, www.asylumseekers.org, which 
sought to secure rights for refugees in Israel. In this 
capacity, I interviewed and engaged in informal 
conversations with South Sudanese refugees who 
resided in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Eilat, and Arad. 
 I learned from several of them that non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) offered them 
assistance to return to South Sudan. It occurred to me 
that NGOs that helped South Sudanese to go back to 
a war-torn area did not necessarily serve the interest of 
these migrants, or, if they did, it was only to offer them 
a less horrible alternative to forced deportation from 
or imprisonment in Israel. I wondered whether a more 
humanitarian course might have included an attempt 
to legalize the presence of these refugees in Israel. 
 The Israeli government began a Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) procedure for some asylum 
seekers in 2010, but not for the South Sudanese. 
According to the 1951 Convention for the Protection 
of Refugees, all signatory states, including Israel, must 
interview individuals and provide refugee status to 
those who can demonstrate that they have been 
persecuted because of their race, ethnicity, religion, or 
membership in a social group. South Sudanese, 
Sudanese, and Eritreans, however, were not allowed to 
access this procedure; they were given informal "group 
protection," which essentially consisted of a 
government decision prior to 2011 not to arrest or 
deport them but also not to give them legal states as 
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refugees or residents. Special visas were issued, to be 
renewed every three months.2 
 Under such "group protection," South Sudanese 
had few rights. They could not work legally in Israel, 
although the relevant ruling, Government Decision 
2104,3 was not enforced before 2012. In the southern 
town of Eilat, the municipal public schools refused 
admission to non-Jewish African asylum seekers, 
including all South Sudanese children, a policy that was 
reversed after the Sudanese left.4 In addition, all South 
Sudanese residents throughout Israel were denied 
medical insurance,5 and employers often paid them less 
than minimum wage.6 
 In 2005 the Sudanese government in the north and 
SPLA in southern Sudan signed a comprehensive 
peace agreement. In July 2011 South Sudan officially 
became an independent country, with Juba its 
provisional capital. In January 2012, half a year after 
independence, Israel's Population and Immigration 
Authority (PIBA) sent an open letter to South 
Sudanese in Israel telling them "Now that South Sudan 
has become an independent state, it is time for you to 
return to your homeland."7 
 The government had persuaded some members of 
the South Sudanese community to gather the names 
and addresses of the South Sudanese in Israel. Officials 
then came to their houses with "voluntary repatriation" 
forms to sign. All had either to repatriate "voluntarily" 
by April 1, 2013, with a 1,000 Euro stipend, or to face 
detention and deportation in April without any 
stipend.8 South Sudanese were told they had three 
options: 
 
1. They could be detained and possibly deported by 
 force or 
2. They could repatriate voluntarily with the 
 assistance of an NGO called Operation Blessing 
 International (OBI) if they had earlier expressed 
 interest in repatriation or 
3. They could repatriate voluntarily via a 
 government-run project dubbed Operation 
 Returning Home,'9  organized by civil servants 
 who eventually headed  a permanent Assisted 
 Voluntary Return (AVR) unit. 
 
A court rejected a petition to reverse this policy,10 and 
nearly all South Sudanese, except for roughly fifty,11 
repatriated. Citizens of Cote d'Ivoire were also told 
they must repatriate in the summer of 2012 or face 
detention and forced deportation.12 
 In this article I will first describe some of the 
research I undertook in Israel, South Sudan, and 
Uganda over seven years, including what I learned 
about the repatriation. I shall then consider the 
possibility that by facilitating repatriation, OBI and a 
similar NGO exploited South Sudanese refugees in 
Israel or, alternatively, were negligent in failing to 
disclose accurate information about South Sudan to 
those considering repatriation. This will require some 
philosophical analysis of the concept of exploitation. I 
will then try to understand when and whether NGOs 
that facilitate repatriation are complicit in policies that 
may be unjust. In this way, I hope to contribute to the 
discussion of the moral obligations of NGOs in 
facilitating the repatriation of refugees. 
 
The Role of NGOs in Repatriation 
 
In 2009 the International Christian Embassy (ICE) and 
OBI established a repatriation service for South 
Sudanese. This began three years before the 
government initiated its AVR program. South Sudan 
was and remains a territory of extreme poverty. Civil 
war erupted there late in 2013. 
 In 2010 while I was in Israel, NGO managers told 
me, in interviews I conducted with them, that 
repatriation had been a relative success. Returnees, I 
was told, were opening businesses, attending school, 
and rebuilding their country after return. In March and 
April 2012, while I was a graduate student at Oxford 
University's African Studies Centre, I went to South 
Sudan to conduct interviews with those who had 
repatriated. In Juba I interviewed ten returnees from 
Israel between the ages of thirty and forty-five. I then 
took a bus to Aweil in Northern Bahr Ghazal State, 
where I interviewed sixteen returnees between the ages 
of fifteen and fifty. I also spoke with a mother and her 
three children who had returned from Israel to the 
secondary town of Wau in South Sudan's Western 
Bahr Ghazal state. 
 Shortly after I left South Sudan in April 2012, 
almost all of the remaining 700 to 1,000 South 
Sudanese in Israel had repatriated to avoid the 2012 
detention threat from PIBA. Many who returned in 
2012 moved to nearby countries shortly after 
repatriation. Therefore, in April to May 2013 I 
travelled to Uganda, where I interviewed 31 returnee 
parents and children. On December 12th 2013 I 
travelled to South Sudan again, to interview those who 
repatriated in the summer of 2012 to avoid 
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government deportation, but who had stayed in South 
Sudan, rather than move to Uganda. 
 I arrived in Juba on December 13th, 2013, with a 
list of ten cell phone numbers of returnees. I checked 
into a modest hotel and managed to conduct two 
interviews on December 14th. The next day, on 
December 15th, fighting broke out in Juba among 
members of the presidential guard, whose base was 
close to my hotel. I called the cell phones of some of 
the returnees whom I planned to interview, and two 
told me they were not safe in their homes in Juba, 
because they were members of the Nuer tribe. They 
had fled to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
camp of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. 
I stayed to bring food and medicine to these two 
returnees in IDP camps, and there I soon met dozens 
of other returnees from Israel. I decided to stay in 
South Sudan to help those who were in the camps and 
to pursue research on the moral ambiguities of NGO-
assisted repatriation, which for me was no less urgent. 
 Because I was there independently, rather than 
funded by an external body, I could use my own 
discretion in deciding where to travel within South 
Sudan and when to leave. I learned two weeks into the 
war, through extensive interviews inside and outside 
the two IDP camps, that five returnees from Israel had 
been killed in the fighting. I told this to reporters I 
knew in Israel and in the U.S., who reported it, 
although they could not enter South Sudan because 
incoming flights has ceased.13 On January 17th 2014 I 
returned to the UK, as I had teaching responsibilities 
during that semester. I hope to go back to South Sudan 
again within a year. 
 
[It] is precisely the prospect of deportation that provides 
a  possible  justification  for  facilitating  repatriation: 
asylum  seekers  and  migrants  may  be  likely  to  be 
deported  regardless,  and  they  may  want  to  have  a 
helping hand to leave beforehand. This was certainly 
the feeling of many returnees to South Sudan. 
 
 I undertook the research I conducted to better 
understand the ethics of repatriation. While empirical 
studies address the role of NGOs in facilitating 
repatriation,14 philosophical analysis tends to focus on 
state obligations,15 rather than on the obligations of 
NGOs in dealing with often ghastly situations. Medical 
ethicists, however, have discussed cases in which 
hospitals in the United States (arguably NGOs) have 
facilitated medical repatriations from the US, when 
migrants do not have medical insurance.16 It has been 
argued that hospitals should not facilitate repatriation 
if those repatriating are leaving only because they fear 
deportation by US immigration authorities, as this 
would not be a voluntary repatriation.17 This 
conclusion is problematic, as it is precisely the prospect 
of deportation that provides a possible justification for 
facilitating repatriation: asylum seekers and migrants 
may be likely to be deported regardless, and they may 
want to have a helping hand to leave beforehand. This 
was certainly the feeling of many returnees to South 
Sudan. 
 
The Repatriation of South Sudanese in Israel 
Between 2009-2012 
 
South Sudan is the world's newest country. In addition 
to suffering from the civil war which continues as of 
this writing, it is one of the poorest countries in the 
world, with one of the worst public health records.18 
Both Juba and secondary towns, such as Aweil and 
Wau, face severe food insecurity.19 
South Sudanese with whom I spoke in Israel in 2010 
were understandably concerned about returning too 
soon to South Sudan, due the widespread poverty, 
crime, internal violence, and the risk of war with 
Sudan.20 Nonetheless, some South Sudanese in Israel 
wanted to return even before independence. Eager to 
help, the ICE began a pilot program of Assisted 
Voluntary Return to South Sudan, including to Juba, 
Aweil, Wau, and other villages and secondary towns. 
OBI took over in 2010, providing a flight, a 1,000 Euro 
stipend, and training courses to those who wished to 
repatriate.21 The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
(HIAS) was hired by ICE and OBI to conduct 
interviews with those who were considering 
repatriation, to ensure they were well-informed and 
were not coerced by the Israeli government into 
leaving. The NGOs helped 900 South Sudanese and 
Sudanese repatriate between 2009 and 2012. Most 
South Sudanese had stayed in Israel up until 2012, 
when the government threatened to detain and deport 
them. 
 When I went to South Sudan in 2012 to speak to 
those whom the NGOs had helped to repatriate, I 
learned that many faced very different conditions than 
they had been led to expect. On the one hand, eight 
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out of the ten I interviewed in Juba in 2012 had 
employment or had started a business. On the other 
hand, only two returnees I interviewed in Aweil had a 
business22–the remainder were unemployed, and 
suffered from fear of hunger and lack of shelter. Nearly 
all lived in houses that would collapse in the rain, as 
they were made out of woven straw mats.23 
 The majority of returnees I met who had resettled 
in rural areas had no memory of rural South Sudan life. 
For example, a woman named Catherine left Abyei for 
Khartoum at age seven and then Khartoum for Cairo 
several years later. While in Israel, she learned about 
South Sudan through television programs on South 
Sudanese Television, produced by the Government of 
South Sudan. A member of OBI had told her that her 
children could learn English in South Sudan.24 An OBI 
worker in Israel told me that all who returned would 
have access to schooling.25 Another woman, Tareza, 
was born in 1990 in Mariel Bai near Aweil, but had 
lived in the capital of Sudan, Khartoum, since infancy 
until age fourteen, and then in Egypt for two years 
before crossing over into Israel. She assumed, before 
returning to South Sudan in April 2011, that it would 
be "fine because it's my country."26 A meeting had 
been organized by OBI in Israel before repatriation. 
Tareza told me that at the meeting, an Israeli who had 
visited Juba promised that there was infrastructure, 
employment, healthcare, and schools in South Sudan. 
None of these were actually provided after 
repatriation.27 
 Some returnees recalled how, before they returned 
to South Sudan, they had been in contact with family 
and friends in their home villages who had promised 
to help. However, friends and family did not always 
provide returnees basic necessities or livelihoods as 
promised. Catherine, who returned to Wau, could not 
rely on her father-in-law's family network: "They only 
say hello on the road, and then move on."28 Nor could 
returnees outside of Juba afford to travel to Juba to 
seek employment, with an overland round trip costing 
approximately $260. Eliza, a mother of four in Aweil, 
could not afford to pay the school fees of 600 SSP 
($133) per year.29 Furthermore, by the time they saw 
they could not find employment, deadlines for World 
Food Program assistance had passed.30 
 In April and May 2013 and in December 2013 to 
January 2014, I went to Uganda and South Sudan to 
speak with those who repatriated to avoid the 2012 
deportation threat from PIBA. They told me they had 
received a lot of misinformation about what they 
would find on their return. As far as I could judge, 
however, they were not misinformed to the same 
extent as those I spoke with who returned before the 
2012 PIBA deportation threat. Those who returned in 
2012, either via OBI or the government AVR unit, felt 
they had been physically forced to repatriate because 
of the threat of deportation. They did not feel that 
misinformation was what led them to choose to 
repatriate, because they did not think they had a choice. 
 In December 2012 and in June 2013 I also 
interviewed two families who have stayed in Israel, in 
hiding. They were not deported, although they remain 
without legal status. They have decided that life in 
Israel without legal status is unquestionably better than 
repatriation to South Sudan.31 Indeed, the majority 
whom I interviewed in South Sudan agreed that they 
might have been better off if they had refused to 
repatriate. 
 
A moral concern arises because it is hardly clear that the 
NGOs facilitated repatriation as a purely 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
Exploitation 
 
A moral concern arises because it is hardly clear that 
the NGOs facilitated repatriation as a purely 
humanitarian intervention. ICE, which facilitated the 
first repatriation flight, defines itself as a "worldwide, 
non-profit ministry of Christian supporters of Israel... 
whose purpose is to remind her of God's promises to 
re-gather His scattered Jewish people to the Land."32 
Pat Robertson, vocally supportive of Israeli policy 
goals, founded OBI and now in his 80s remains on its 
board.33 
 Mikhail Valdman has argued that "one wrongly 
exploits another when and only when...one extracts 
excessive benefits from someone who cannot, or 
cannot reasonably, refuse one's offer."34 Valdman 
provides the following example: Person A agrees to 
provide an antidote to B, a lone hiker, who has been 
bitten by a poisonous snake, in return for $20,000, 
though it retails for $10. In this example, Person A 
extracts an excessive benefit from B when viewed 
against the baseline of an ordinary market exchange, 
i.e., in view of what it costs A to give B the medicine. 
Note, as well, that both parties in an exploitative 
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exchange may view the exchange as beneficial 
compared to not entering the exchange at all, even if 
the exchange is worse for B compared to the type of 
exchange that would occur were B not in distress. 
 
What is morally problematic is that OBI in response to 
its donor base may have focused more on repatriating as 
many South Sudanese as possible than on their serving 
their best interest. 
 
 I want to ask whether OBI exploited South 
Sudanese in facilitating their repatriation. Economists 
use the term "rent" to describe the amount of a person 
pays to acquire a good beyond its competitive market 
price or opportunity cost. If OBI had used the plight 
of the South Sudanese to extract "rent" or a high price 
from them, it could have exploited these refugees, in 
the way Person A exploited the hiker. 
 I agree with the literature that defines "excessive 
benefit" as any benefit that is above what the exploiter 
ought to have benefited, were she to fulfil her basic 
moral obligations or duties.35 These moral obligations 
or duties are relevant baselines, and a benefit extracted 
because one has failed to fulfil these duties is 
exploitative. Some scholars, such as Hillel Steiner,36 
view exploitation as involving a benefit above what the 
exploiter would obtain, had the exploited not faced 
some rights violation, including a violation by some 
third party unrelated to the exploiter. In this case, there 
is also an implied moral baseline of what the exploiter 
ought to give the exploited. The baseline is the price 
the exploited ought to be charged or ought to accept, 
were the exploited not to have suffered a rights 
violation. South Sudanese suffered a rights violation 
when they were denied the right to apply for refugee 
status in Israel. Perhaps OBI exploited them, if OBI 
benefited from South Sudanese repatriating under 
such circumstances. 
 The "rent" – if I may use that economic term – OBI 
extracted in this situation did not involve any monetary 
payment from the refugees. One could argue, however, 
that the price OBI extracted from the refugees 
included the sacrifice of whatever legal rights they 
might have obtained had they remained in Israel. We 
can call this a price, and not merely an unrelated 
unfortunate consequence for South Sudanese, insofar 
as this sacrifice was essential for ICE and OBI to 
promote their own (and Israel's) ideological and 
political goals. It is difficult or impossible, however, to 
quantify the sacrifice the South Sudanese made in 
leaving Israel because one can only speculate about 
how well they would have fared if (possibly with the 
help of NGOs) they had contested or resisted the 
deportation order. 
 The extraction is indirect, but it may be exploitation 
nonetheless. OBI gained donations in return for 
repatriating South Sudanese. OBI was not paid by the 
South Sudanese, but by external donors, whose 
support included funding for salaries and the travel of 
personnel. This funding may have been available only 
for a repatriation program and not for humanitarian 
purposes in general. 
 One may argue that OBI had a duty to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the South Sudanese 
migrants, perhaps because OBI implicitly promised to 
do so or because they had that role to fulfill. If so, OBI 
had a moral duty to treat South Sudanese as ends-in-
themselves. Their welfare, however, may not have 
been the primary purpose of the repatriation. Rather 
the effort may have been motivated by the attempt to 
"re-gather His scattered Jewish people to the Land." 
The South Sudanese were not considered to be "His 
people." What is morally problematic is that OBI in 
response to its donor base may have focused more on 
repatriating as many South Sudanese as possible than 
on their serving their best interest. 
 On the other hand, perhaps the only way OBI 
could acquire any funds was by promising repatriation; 
if so the OBI director possibly could either offer 
repatriation or nothing at all. If repatriation is better 
than no charity at all, and if there was nothing else OBI 
could offer, perhaps OBI was not exploitative but 
simply did what it could in a dire situation. 
 I believe there is something else OBI could have 
offered. OBI could have appealed to donors to provide 
more funds for a safer return, even if donors wanted 
to earmark their donations for repatriation. How much 
more in security and assistance should OBI have 
offered to South Sudanese when facilitating their 
repatriation, to avoid charges of exploitation? One 
could opine that the NGOs, to avoid the charge of 
exploitation, ought to have given South Sudanese at a 
minimum the kind of assistance they would have 
accepted to repatriate, were they not facing forcible 
deportation or detention without an RSD process. Yet, 
how does one really know what South Sudanese would 
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have accepted, had the Israeli government set up a 
working RSD procedure? 
 One may be tempted to argue, for example, that 
OBI's offer of 1,000 Euro in "reintegration assistance" 
and some job training was not enough because, if 
South Sudanese were able to access residency and 
refugee status in Israel, they would have agreed to 
repatriate only with far more assistance. Yet, even if 
Israel had a working RSD process, perhaps South 
Sudanese would have been unable to prove they were 
refugees, and so would have accepted whatever OBI 
had to offer in excess of the government-sponsored 
program. The question whether the South Sudanese in 
Israel had a legal claim to refugee status under 
international law becomes a factor in determining the 
moral baseline of efforts to repatriate them. 
 Some rights should have been granted to them 
regardless of whether they gained refugee status, such 
as access to education for children and basic 
healthcare; other rights, however, are contingent on 
the consequences of having access to the right to an 
RSD process. To determine fully what OBI owed the 
South Sudanese to avoid being exploitative, one 
depends on a counterfactual chain of events that are 
impossible to calculate. Since the baseline legal right of 
the South Sudanese to refugee status in Israel is so 
uncertain, it may not be possible–it is certainly not 
easy–to determine the extent that OBI was exploitative 
in repatriating South Sudanese from Israel. 
 
In this context, one may ask whether the problems of 
misinformation, the lack of follow-up, and so forth, 
which I have described, represented 1) an intentional 
failure to disclose information, to encourage South 
Sudanese to repatriate or 2) an instance of negligence. 
 
 
Misleading Information 
 
There is another way South Sudanese may have been 
exploited. According to a number of philosophical 
arguments, exploitation can involve taking advantage 
of someone who is ignorant of key relevant facts.37 
One party may be vulnerable because they lack 
information, or their rights could be violated by the 
exploiter, if the exploiter has a duty to disclose certain 
information. One might ask, then, if OBI knew how 
tough things were in South Sudan and thus misled the 
South Sudanese migrants. If OBI did not know, which 
is possible given the volatility there, was this 
intentional, or just negligent? How much diligence was 
due on the part of OBI given the limited choice 
available to the South Sudanese? 
 HIAS knew relatively little about South Sudan, 
even though it was hired by OBI to determine if those 
returning were fully informed about the conditions 
there. The little information on Sudan that was 
available in the HIAS training manual for employees 
was not particularly accurate or well-cited. For 
example, the manual states: "...although Sudan might 
not have the same services as we have in Israel, their 
family is a significant factor for positive mental health 
- indeed a strong pull factor for their return." The 
manual also states: "Many applicants might not be 
aware of the entire situation in Sudan. Instead, they 
might only know about the circumstances in their 
village. This is OK."38 
 OBI employees with whom I spoke stated that they 
called returnees on a monthly basis, but none of the 
returnees whom I interviewed in Aweil and Wau had 
been contacted. Rachel, the OBI employee I 
interviewed, explained to me that they had fallen 
behind in contacting returnees as promised.39 She said 
that one challenge was that returnees often did not 
speak English or Hebrew, but only Arabic and one or 
two additional tribal languages. There was no native 
Arabic speaker on the OBI staff until 2012, making 
communication difficult. 
 In 2012, when migration authorities in Israel told 
South Sudanese that they would be imprisoned if they 
did not repatriate, OBI stopped accepting new 
applicants. However, those who had expressed any 
interest in repatriation before the prison and 
deportation threat could repatriate via OBI.40 During 
the deportation, OBI also organized meetings within 
the South Sudanese community in Israel. At these 
meetings, the OBI director, the Israeli Ambassador to 
South Sudan, and a South Sudanese government 
employee claimed that it was safe to repatriate.41 
 In this context, one may ask whether the problems 
of misinformation, the lack of follow-up, and so forth, 
which I have described, represented 1) an intentional 
failure to disclose information, to encourage South 
Sudanese to repatriate or 2) an instance of negligence. 
It seems that intent is important for exploitation, but 
not for negligence.42 It is not that negligence is any less 
serious. Negligence, like exploitation, can also benefit 
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a stronger party. Furthermore, the recipients of a 
negligent offer, just like the recipients of an 
exploitative offer, may face a demeaning choice.43 Yet 
negligence does not involve intent, and so it is a 
distinct wrong, with a distinct policy solution. If OBI 
did not know what information on South Sudan it 
lacked, that is different than if it did. 
 It seems clear to me after talking with affected 
individuals that OBI, if it had hired a native Arab 
speaker to conduct phone calls to returnees, could 
have learned more about the conditions they found 
when they returned. About 20% of Israel's population 
are native Arabic speaking Palestinians with Israeli 
citizenship. Furthermore, OBI could have easily 
contacted those living in Aweil and Wau, were they to 
have contacted other NGOs in Israel, as I did, such as 
the Hotline for Migrant Workers and the Aid 
Organization for Refugees and Asylum Seekers. 
Rachel, the OBI employee I interviewed, expressed 
regret at OBI's failure to build a relationship with these 
organizations. When the OBI director told me "there 
is health insurance and free education in South 
Sudan,"44 OBI may have genuinely thought it to be 
true. However, OBI could have obtained more 
accurate information if it had tried to do so. 
 Because it would have been relatively costless to 
provide more information, it may be that OBI did, in 
fact, foresee the consequences of its actions. 
Furthermore, OBI's failure to adequately inform the 
refugees of their prospects looks like exploitation 
rather than negligence insofar as it served an ulterior 
interest which was to repatriate the South Sudanese. 
 
 
To what extent were the NGOs complicit in the refusal 
of the government to hear the status claims of the South 
Sudanese? One may argue that the NGOs would have 
been complicit in this policy if 1) the policy would not 
have been implemented or would have been softened but 
for the work of the NGOs; and 2) the policy was 
influenced by the work of the NGOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Complicity and the Policy Effect of the 
Repatriation Option 
 
According to Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin, for 
an NGO to be complicit in a wrong, such as an unjust 
government policy, its actions must be necessary and 
sufficient for that wrong to have occurred in the 
circumstances or even if the world were somewhat 
different. In other words, "the agent's actions could have 
been necessary and sufficient for the injustice if the 
world was slightly different.45 In this case, one can argue 
that there was a significant injustice when Israel 
refused to initiate an RSD process for the South 
Sudanese. The claim that this was an injustice would 
be consistent with a range of views on immigration.46 
Regardless of whether South Sudanese were actually 
refugees, it seems that they had a right to have their 
claims heard. 
 To what extent were the NGOs complicit in the 
refusal of the government to hear the status claims of 
the South Sudanese? One may argue that the NGOs 
would have been complicit in this policy if 1) the policy 
would not have been implemented or would have been 
softened but for the work of the NGOs; and 2) the 
policy was influenced by the work of the NGOs.47 
 Neither of these conditions seems to hold. As I 
noted earlier, it was not only through OBI that 
individuals repatriated. The government had its own 
repatriation program, set up in 2012, the AVR Unit. 
Perhaps the government's AVR unit, which was less 
generous, played the bad cop to the OBI good cop. On 
one hand, one could argue that OBI humanely pre-
empted the government repatriation, which would 
have occurred regardless of how OBI acted. On the 
other hand, pre-emption is hardly grounds for avoiding 
complicity, because if the world were slightly different 
— if the government did not have its own repatriation 
program — then OBI would have had a bigger impact. 
However, one may argue that the world would have to 
be very different indeed for the Israeli government to 
have had no AVR unit; it was and is an integral part of 
their immigration policy. If the success of voluntary 
repatriation did encourage the government not to 
initiate an RSD procedure, but if repatriation was 
possible without OBI, then OBI's actions were not 
necessary or sufficient for the decisions of the Israeli 
government, nor would they have been necessary or 
sufficient if the world were only slightly different. 
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This photograph, taken in an IDP camp in Juba by a photographer who wishes to be anonymous, shows two parents who lost a child to 
malaria shortly after their family returned to South Sudan from Israel. They fled to the IDP camp after armed men had entered their 
neighborhood and began to execute civilians who were members of the Nuer tribe.  Faces are smudged to protect the identity and safety of 
the refugees.  The photograph is used with permission. 
 
 
Yet, perhaps the world without the government 
repatriation would only be slightly different. Indeed, the 
government runs its repatriation program with only 
two staff members, from a small office. As such, we 
can consider whether OBI was complicit by 
determining what would have happened without OBI, 
in a world slightly different from our own, where the 
government had no repatriation program. 
Furthermore, OBI really was the only NGO to provide 
repatriation up until 2012. It is possible to speculate 
that if a sizeable number of South Sudanese chose to 
stay and go to prison in Israel, or if they had to be 
physically deported, as it were, in chains, Israel might 
have initiated an RSD process or done something else 
to limit the damage to its image at home and abroad. 
The availability of repatriation–facilitated by NGOs–
might have lessened pressure on Israel to initiate an 
RSD process for the South Sudanese. Israel avoided 
embarrassment because the South Sudanese 
repatriated voluntarily. Did this make it easier for Israel 
to threaten them with physical deportation or life 
imprisonment without an RSD process–threats it 
might have found difficult to carry out? 
 
 
 
 
Yet again, by acting as an independent NGO with 
humanitarian credentials, OBI might have abetted 
Israeli policy by providing a moral cover as well as an 
easier path for repatriation. 
 
 Unfortunately, I am not able travel to a 
counterfactual world and conduct empirical research 
there. This may be a problem for all philosophers. I am 
unable to compare the real world, where both OBI and 
the AVR unit existed, to hypothetical worlds without 
the AVR unit and/or without OBI. Would the South 
Sudanese have been treated differently by the Israeli 
government if NGOs did not assist in repatriation? It 
is nearly impossible to get a purchase on this question. 
To try to do so, one can compare the experience of the 
South Sudanese refugees to the experience of other 
groups of refugees in Israel who did not have access to 
a repatriation process. In other words, one can look to 
see if there is a correlation between 1) the work of 
NGOs to facilitate repatriation and 2) the willingness 
of Israel to threaten to force repatriation and to refuse 
to initiate an RSD process. Plainly correlation is not 
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causation, but one can try to tease out the 
counterfactual and hypothetical this way. 
 Congolese asylum seekers in Israel, for example, 
were not threatened with imprisonment to anything 
like the same extent as the South Sudanese. No NGO-
assisted repatriation process was offered to them. This 
example may be considered evidence in support of the 
claim that OBI's repatriation scheme causally 
contributed to the Israeli government's policy of 
detention and forced deportation without access to an 
RSD procedure. There is counter-evidence. Ivoirians 
were threatened with imprisonment in 2012 alongside 
South Sudanese and never had access to a repatriation 
scheme by a private charity, OBI or otherwise. More 
empirical research is needed, and it would help to make 
comparisons across countries and times. 
 Yet again, by acting as an independent NGO with 
humanitarian credentials, OBI might have abetted 
Israeli policy by providing a moral cover as well as an 
easier path for repatriation. Furthermore, the Israeli 
government was perhaps emboldened to administer its 
own repatriation, the AVR unit, precisely because it 
saw that many were repatriating through OBI; it saw 
that, since so many refugees did repatriate via OBI, it 
could get the others to leave. As such, perhaps OBI 
causally contributed because, in the absence of OBI 
repatriation, the government would have to take the 
moral onus of repatriation on itself. It was not just that 
OBI pre-empted the AVR unit, it is that OBI causally 
contributed to the government's overall policy. 
Therefore, it is possible that OBI did not merely pre-
empt the AVR unit. OBI possibly caused the AVR unit 
to exist to begin with. 
 We are left with a unique chicken and egg dilemma, 
which Lepora and Goodin's definition of complicity 
cannot quite resolve. To wit: 1) The threat by the 
government to repatriate by force encouraged OBI to 
create its own more humane repatriation scheme, and 
2) that more humane repatriation scheme encouraged 
the government to threaten to repatriate the South 
Sudanese by force. 
 
"We Had No Choice" 
 
None of the South Sudanese I interviewed were 
actually deported. "Why did you go back to South 
Sudan?" I asked. "Because we needed to. The 
government told us to go back." I persisted, "So they 
forced you, physically, to go back?" In an IDP camp, 
one returnee answered "No," as he crouched under 
bed sheets draped over twigs, his shelter since the war 
began. "If we hadn't gone back, the Israeli immigration 
would have detained us. So we signed a form, and 
agreed to go back."48 
 Why did nearly every South Sudanese national in 
Israel agree to repatriate by 2012 rather than face the 
threatened consequences? The co-operation of the 
South Sudanese in their repatriation is puzzling in part 
because many of them were not naive about what they 
would find when they returned. "Did you know or 
suspect what would happen to you when you decided 
to go back?" I asked those I met in South Sudan, both 
times I went, and I put this question to those living 
inside and outside the IDP camps after the civil war 
began. Many replied that they did, indeed, suspect what 
would happen to them. 
 What did happen to those who went back? By far 
the most widespread risk was malaria, and I heard 
rumours that over thirty individuals died from the 
disease among those who returned. This, based on the 
newest data on malaria in South Sudan,49 seems likely. 
A lack of resources for housing and food was also 
widespread. When the civil war began, those who 
repatriated also faced ethnically-targeted killings, by 
Dinka militias against Nuer citizens, and Nuer militias 
against Dinka citizens, depending on the region. 
 One South Sudanese returnee I met, Gatluak, had 
been an active member of the Nuer community in 
Israel. Before return, a friend already in South Sudan 
warned him that, if he repatriated to South Sudan, his 
life might be at risk. While still in Israel, he hired a 
lawyer and applied for refugee status, and his 
application was rejected. He returned and, when the 
war started, Dinka militias came to his home in Juba, 
beat him up, and tried to arrest him, but he managed 
to flee to the IDP camp. "Why did you decide to go 
back, rather than go to detention in Israel?" I asked 
him. He was not the victim of misinformation. He 
responded that he was told by immigration authorities 
that he would be forcibly deported from detention if 
he did not consent to repatriation.50 Others I spoke 
with simply feared imprisonment for life. I was always 
told, "We had no choice." 
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If better services to the refugees under the circumstances 
could not have been provided by NGOs, and if there was 
nothing they could do to change government policy, then 
perhaps they were not complicit, exploitative, or 
negligent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Why did Israel fail to initiate an RSD process for the 
South Sudanese? It seemed obligated under 
international law to do so, but that may not be the 
whole story. Given that things are very bad in South 
Sudan, could any South Sudanese claim refugee status 
if he or she managed to cross into Israel from Egypt? 
One may speculate that if the number of asylum 
seekers in Israel were few and not apt to increase, there 
may have been an RSD process to weigh the 
circumstances of each individual. My experience 
suggests that the growing number of asylum seekers 
who might be eligible for an RSD process was a 
concern for the Israeli government. 
 In 2007, before OBI set up its program, the 
majority of members of Israel's parliament signed a 
petition to end to the detention of Sudanese asylum 
seekers, to cease deportations at the border, and to 
support the implementation of an RSD procedure.51 
Another student and I spent a month in 2007 trying to 
reach and to persuade Benjamin Netanyahu, who was 
head of the opposition at the time, to sign the petition. 
In the final week of July, we found Mr. Netanayhu 
outside of the plenum in Israel's parliament, where he 
had just left for his lunch break. In lieu of a formal 
meeting, we walked with him to the cafeteria. After we 
spoke with him, he eventually agreed to sign the 
petition, but only after telling us that he did not 
support a single additional Sudanese entering the 
country. 
 Netanyahu later (as Prime Minister) supported 
detention, but this may have been because there were 
so many more asylum seekers in the country, and this 
was not related to OBI's repatriation program. It is 
conceivable that Israel took a tough position because 
it wanted to discourage more asylum seekers from 
crossing the border from Egypt. If the South Sudanese 
had been able to access an RSD process, more and 
more South Sudanese may have found their way into 
Israel and claimed refugee status there. I believe many 
in Israel including Netanyahu were worried about this 
prospect. Even if Netanyahu's policy as Prime Minister 
was not just, it suggests that OBI's offer of repatriation 
was not the only contributing factor to the government 
policy of refusing to implement an RSD process and 
threatening South Sudanese with deportation and 
detention. 
 I cannot compare the real world in which Israel 
emptied itself of the South Sudanese nationals through 
various incentives to a hypothetical world in which 
these same South Sudanese refused those incentives or 
in which Israel initiated an RSD process. I know that 
the few South Sudanese who remained were not 
forcibly deported, but they may be left in peace 
because there are so few of them. 
 If better services to the refugees under the 
circumstances could not have been provided by 
NGOs, and if there was nothing they could do to 
change government policy, then perhaps they were not 
complicit, exploitative, or negligent. There is a great 
deal to be discussed and to know about the appropriate 
roles of NGOs in assisting voluntary repatriation as an 
alternative to forced repatriation or worse. One ought 
to try to understand what role they play, in terms of 
causality and responsibility. At the same time, one 
cannot mount a moral high horse in the matter; indeed, 
the moral high ground is often difficult to find except 
in a counterfactual world. 
 
Mollie Gerver is a PhD candidate in the Department 
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Economics and Political Science. 
 
Notes: 
1Nathan (2012), p. 13. 
2Yaron et al. (2013). 
3Nathan, op. Cit. 
4Beer Sheva Administrative Court petition no. 29883-07-
 11 (Hebrew), HCJ 6312/10 (Hebrew). 
5Protocol No. 64: "Special Committee for the Evaluation 
 for the Problem of Foreign Workers" (Hebrew).  
6Furst-Nichols and Jacobson (2011). 
7For the text of the letter sent to South Sudanese, see 
PIBA "A Call for the people of South Sudan" 
(31/01/11) 
http://www.piba.gov.il/SpokesmanshipMessagess/ 
Documents/2012-2192.pdf. 
8Ibid. 
9Lijnders (2013). 
10Administrative Petition (Jerusalem) 53765-03-12: ASSAF 
 Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 
 
 
 
 
12  Volume 32, Number 1 (Spring 2014) 
 vs. Ministry of Interior (7.6.12). 
11Interview with Rami Gudovitch, Tel Aviv 19 March 
2013.  
12Administrative Petition (Jerusalem) 58161-01-12 Abu 
 Bakuyoko vs. Ministry of Interior (24-6-12). 
13Frankel (2014). 
14Blitz et al. (2005); Webber (2011). 
15Long (2013); Bradley (2013). 
16Kuczewski (2012); Oakley and Sorell (2012). See also 
 Wak and Schonfeild (2012); and (2012). 
17Cantwell (2012). 
18Rai (2012). 
19Tappis et al. (2013). 
20Interview with Gatwech, 20 July 2010, Jerusalem; 
 Interview with George, 24 March 2009, Jerusalem; 
 Interview with Yasmin 10 January 2008; interview with 
 Gabriel, 10 October 2008. 
21Interview with OBI Director and AVR Project Manager, 
 Jerusalem, 6 October 2010. 
22Interview with Nyabang, Aweil, 30 March 2012. 
23Personal observations, March-April 2012. 
24Interview with Catherine, Wau, 4 April 2012. 
25Interview with OBI Director and AVR Project Manager, 
6 October 2010. 
26Interview with Tareza, Aweil, 26 March 2012. 
27Interview with Nyanath, Aweil, 25 March 2012. 
28Catherine op cit. 
29Interview with Eliza, Aweil, 25 March 2012. 
30Interview with Ajuk, Aweil, 31 March 2012. 
31Interview with Florence, Tel Aviv, 18 December 2012 
 and Interview with Gloria, Tel Aviv, 14 August 2013. 
32http://int.icej.org/ 
33OBI Annual Report, 2011. 
 http://www.ob.org/press_room/annual_report/ 
 OBI_FY11_AnnualReport.pdf. See also McDonnell 
 (2013). 
34Valdman (2009). 
35See Lifshitz (2008); Joseph Millum (2014); and Miller and 
 Wertheimer (2009). 
36Steiner (2013). 
37See for the relation between "misrepresentation" and 
 "exploitation" see, for example, McClurg (2014). 
38The director of HIAS - Israel provided me with their 
 training manual, which is not available for public view. 
39Interview with Rachel, Tel Aviv, 3 January 2013. 
40Interview with Director of HIAS-Israel, Jerusalem, 11 
 December 2012. 
41Interview with David, Juba, January 10th 2014; Interview 
 with Peter in UN IDP camp, Juba, 1 January 2014; 
 Interview with Samuel, Juba, December 22 2013; 
 Interview with Phillip, 26 December 2013, Juba; 
 Interview with Tahani, Juba, 25 December 2013. 
 Tahani described a meeting that took place with the 
 OBI Director and the Israeli Ambassador to South 
 Sudan at the time, Dan Shaham. 
42Ferguson (2013). 
43Jeremy Snyder (2013) "Exploitation and Demeaning 
 Choices" Politics, Philosophy, Economics 12(4): pp. 
 345-360. 
44Interview with OBI Director, ibid. 
45Lepora and Goodin (2003). 
46For a range of views that are consistent with my 
argument on complicity, see Gibney (2004); Betts 
(2013) Lister (2013); Carens (2013); Sandelind (2014); 
and Kukathas  (2012). 
47For discussion see Lewis (2000). But see Bigaj (2012). 
48Interview with Dan, Juba, 9 January 2014. 
49Margaret B Eyobo et al. (2014). 
50Interview with Gatluak, Juba, 21 December, 2013. 
51Willen (2010). 
Sources: 
Appel, J. M. (2012). “Medical Repatriation Does not Justify 
 Hospital Entanglement in Nonmedical Matters.” The 
 American Journal of Bioethics, 12(9), pp. 9-11. 
Betts, A. (2013). Survival Migration: Failed Governance and 
the 
 Crisis of Displacement. Cornell University Press. 
Bigaj, T. (2012). “Causation Without Influence.” 
 Erkenntnis, 76(1), pp. 1-22. 
Blitz, B. K., Sales, R., & Marzano, L. (2005). “Non 
 Voluntary Return? The Politics of Return to 
 Afghanistan.” Political Studies, 53(1), pp. 182-200. 
Bradley, M. (2013). Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility, Redress. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cantwell, P. (2012). “Relevant Material: Importing the 
 Principles of Informed Consent and Unconscionability 
 to Analyze Consensual Medical Repatriations.” Harvard 
 Law & Policy Review 6, p. 249. 
Carens, J. (2013). The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press. 
Eyobo, M. B., Awur, A. C., Wani, G., Julla, A. I., Remijo, 
 C. D., Sebit, B., & Chanda, E. (2014). “Malaria 
 indicator survey 2009, South Sudan: baseline results at 
 household level.” Malaria journal, 13(1), p. 45. 
Ferguson, B. (2013). The paradox of exploitation: a new solution  
 (Doctoral dissertation, The London School of   
 Economics and Political Science (LSE)). 
Frankel, S. (2014). “South Sudanese in Israel 'Choose 
 between prison and death.'” Buzzfeed (January 17th 
 2014). 
Furst-Nichols, R., & Jacobsen, K. (2011). “African 
 migration to Israel: Debt, employment, and 
 remittances.” Available online at: 
 https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC 
 /African+Migration+to+Is rael 
Gibney, M. J. (2004). The ethics andpolitics of asylum: 
liberal 
 democracy and the response to refugees. Cambridge 
University 
 Press. 
 Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 
 
 
 
 
13 
Gilad N. (2013). "The Policy Towards the Population of 
 Infiltrators, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in Israel and 
 European Countries" Israel Knesset Research and 
 Information Center (2012) p. 13 (Hebrew) 
Kuczewski, M. (2012). “Can medical repatriation be 
 ethical?: Establishing best practices.” The American 
 Journal of Bioethics, 12(9), pp. 1-5. 
Kukathas, C. (2012). “Why open borders?” Ethical 
 perspectives- Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 19(4), pp. 649-
 675. 
Lepora, C., & Goodin, R. E. (2013). On complicity and 
 compromise. Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, D. (2000). “Causation as influence.” Journal of 
 Philosophy 97(4): pp. 182—197. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linders, L. (2013). Forced Migration Review 44: 66 
 (September). Available online at: 
 http://www.fmreview.org/detention/lijnders 
Lipshitz, S. (2007). “Distress exploitation contracts in the 
 shadow of no duty to rescue.” North Carolina Law 
 Review, (86) p. 315. 
Lister, M. (2013). “Who are Refugees?” Law and Philosophy, 
 32(5), pp. 645-671. 
Long, Katy (2013). The Point of No Return: Refugees, 
Rights, 
 and Repatriation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McClurg, A. J. (2014). “Preying on the Graying: A 
 Statutory Presumption to Prosecute Elder Financial 
 Exploitation.” Hastings Law Journal, 65(4). 
